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This study assesses the genetic heritability of various survey response styles using a
classical twin design. The National Survey of Midlife Development in the United
States (MIDUS) collected in 1995‐96 included an oversample of twins with self‐
reported zygosity along with a large number of survey items that allowed for the
assessment of acquiescent and extreme response style. The MIDUS singleton
sample was used for the careful development of appropriate and reliable measures
of these traits. The second wave of the MIDUS (2005‐06), was used to assess the
sources of survey response trait stability. Acquiescence appears to have a sizable
and significant heritability component (~25% to 34%) and is not influenced by the
environment co‐twins share; extreme response has a smaller and nonsignificant
heritable component (~20%) and a more sizable shared environmental effect
(~32%). Additive genetic and common environmental effects drive the test‐retest
stability of traits. The variation explained by these two effects also wholly
contributes to the covariation across waves as well. Controlling for income and
education does not change results. Results suggest it is inappropriate to treat
acquiescence and extreme response as a single survey response style phenomena
and call for the exploration of specific genes in the case of acquiescence and social
and familial environmental predictors of extreme response.

Acknowledgements:

Primarily, I would like to thank my committee. Without the infinitely helpful
guidance of Bob Belli and John Hibbing this project could never have become what it
is now. I would like to thank people I received comments from, especially
participants of The 2009 International Workshop on Statistical Genetics and
Methodology of Twin and Family Studies, notably Lindon Eaves, Nick Martin, Mike
Neale, Pete Hatemi and Stacey Cherny, who all commented on a poster version of
the first iteration of this study. Thanks to the participants of the Doctoral Seminar at
the Central European University, Department of Political Science where I had the
pleasure and opportunity to present this thesis, with special thanks to my
discussant Gabor Toka. Many thanks to those who commented on various versions:
Zoltan Fazekas, Matthew Hibbing and Brennen Bearnes. Megan Thornton, my wife,
deserves a special big thank you for all the support, proofreading and language
editing. Many, many thanks to Barb Rolfes for all the logistics help. To everyone at
SRAM, it becomes more and more apparent over time how much I learned from you,
thank you. A very special thanks goes to Allan McCutcheon for recruiting me into
the Survey Research and Methodology program, offering his guidance during my
time there, and introducing me to Tamas Rudas though whom I received my dream
job straight out of college. I feel a small hole in my life for not being able to work
with him on this final project. This thesis is dedicated to Dindi who left us in
September 2009 a day short of her 101st birthday. Her birth predates modern
survey research or political science research. She will forever be missed.

1
Introduction

Survey researchers have long studied questions such as why do some people
acquiesce on questionnaires without regard to the specific questions asked (Cheung
and Resvold 2000, Javeline 1999, Kuethe 1960, Lentz 1938, Marin et al 1992, Ross
and Mirowsky 1996, Smith 2004)? Why do some people select extreme responses
while others deviate more to the center values (Arce‐Ferrer 2006, Berg and Colier
1953, Cheung and Resvold 2000, Chun et al 1974, Clarke 2000, Clarke 2001, de Jong
et al 2008, Greenleaf 1992, Hui and Triandis 1989, Lewis and Taylor 1955, Light and
Zax 1965, Marin et al 1992)? What predicts satisficing (Belli et al. 1999, Krosnick
1991, Holbrook et al 2003)? These issues have been studied since researchers first
suspected that surveys are not entirely error free measurement instruments (Lorge
1937, Lentz 1938). They have been called survey response styles (Bachman and
O’Malley 1984, Baumgartner and Steenkamp 2001, Chen et al 1995, Gilman et al
2008, Jackson and Pacine 1961, Johnson et al 2005, Lamm and Keller 2007, Stening
and Everett 1984, van Herk et al 2004), response sets (Berg and Colier 1953,
Cheung and Resvold 2000, Cronbach 1946, Fricke1956, Hui and Triandis 1985,
Kuethe 1960, Landsberger Saavedra 1967), response effects (Ayidiya and
Mcclendon 1990, Javeline 1999, Kieslerey and Sproull1986, Narayan and Krosnick
1996) and response bias (Carr and Krause 1978, Holbrook et al 2003, Smith 2004).
Two constructs that are often examined are acquiescence and extreme response
(Arce‐Ferrer et al 2006, Ayidiya and McClendon 1990, Baumgartner and Steenkamp
2001, Berg and Collier 1953, Biemer 2001, Carr and Kraus 1978, Chen et al 1995,

2
Cheung and Rensvold 2000, Chun et al 1974, Clarke 2000, Clarke 2001, de Jong et al
2008, Fricke 1956, Gilman et al 2008, Holbrook et al 2003, Hui and Triandis 1985,
Jackson and Pacine 1961, Javeline 1999, Johnson et al 2005, Jordan et al 1980,
Kiesler and Sproull 1986, Kuethe 1960, Lamm and Keller 2007, Landsberger and
Saavedra 1967, Lenski and Leggett 1960, Lewis and Taylor 1955, Light and Zax
1965, Marin et al 1992, Narayan and Krosnick 1996, Ross and Mirowsky 1996,
Roster et al 2007, Shulman 1973, Smith 2004, Stening and Everett 1984, van Herk et
al 2004, Watkins and Cheung 1995).
A large number of environmental independent variables have been explored
and identified as predictors of acquiescence and extreme response1. It is also well
established that acquiescence and extreme response are stable traits in test‐retest
situations even when several years pass between tests (Berg and Collier 1953,
Bachman and O'Malley 1984). Theoretical and empirical research tied survey
response styles to cognitive ability, altruism and accountability (Krosnick 1991,
Krosnick 1999, Belli et al 1999), which are either directly or through personality
traits could provide a mechanism for survey response styles to be genetically
heritable (for studies on the heritability of personality see Eysenck and Prell 1951,
Jang et al 1998, Loehlin and Nichols 1976, Rose et al 1988, Rushton et al 1986,
Bouchard et al 1990, Pederson et al 1988, Horn et al 1976, Tellegen et al 1988,
Heath et al 1992, McCrae and Costa 2003, Riemann et al 1997). Based on this
information it is a serious plausibility that people’s genetic makeup could influence

1

For a detailed review see next section.
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how they respond to surveys. This thesis tests the proposition that survey response
styles are genetically heritable.
Behavior genetics has been a prevalent subfield in psychology (Jang et al
1998, van Beijsterveldt and van Baal 2002) but other social sciences have been slow
to consider the possibility that genes can influence behaviors. Alford, Funk and
Hibbing’s (2005) American Political Science Review (APSR) article exploring the
genetic transmission of political attitudes laid the groundwork for this type of
research within political science. Findings of this article have appeared in popular
media (such as The New York Times) and the article became the most downloaded
article of the APSR. It was cited by the editor as the most important article
published by the journal in its 100 year history (Sigelman 2006). Since then, several
pieces exploring how genetics could influence political behavior have appeared in
top political science journals such as Political Analysis (Medland and Hatemi 2009),
The Journal of Politics (Hatemi et al 2009, Hatemi et al 2009, Fowler and Dawes
2008, Dawes and Fowler 2009) and Political Research Quarterly (Settle et al 2009,
Hatemi et al 2009). Two articles on the topic are also published in Science (Oxley et
al 2008, Fowler and Schreiber 2008).
Economists are also starting to publish work on genetic predictors of
economic behavior in prestigious journals such as the Proceedings of the National
Academy of Science (Cesarini et al 2008) and The Quarterly Journal of Economics
(Cesarini et al 2009). The topic has also gained press within sociology (Guo and
Stearns 2002, Eaves et al 2008, also see special issue on biological predictors of
social behavior in Social Forces September 2006, Issue 85:1). Behavior geneticists
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have also developed an interest in the “phenotypes” studied by social scientists. The
Behavior Genetics Association’s journal, Behavior Genetics, has already published
articles on the topic of politics (Hatemi et al 2007, Eaves and Hatemi 2008) and also
genes’ interactions with socio‐economic variables (Harden et al 2007).
While the use of biological predictors of political behavior are not new to the
field (Madsen 1985, Madsen 1986) recent publications have spawned debates
within political science (Charney 2008a, Alford et al 2008a, Hannagan and Hatemi
2008 and Charney 2008b, Beckwith and Morris 2008, Alford et al 2008b). Similar
debates have taken place in other social science disciplines such as Sociology
(Horwitz et al 2003b, Freese and Powel 2003, Horwitz et al 2003 a), Educational
Psychology (Richardson and Norgate 2005), and Psychology (Joseph 2001). After a
review of the debates, this thesis brings our own field of survey research on board
with the behavior genetic research agenda through assessing the heritability of
survey response styles.

Survey Response Sets and Survey Response Styles

Survey response styles are a problem for the measurement of unbiased true
scores of any latent construct. While random measurement error is manageable by
statistical methods and, even if unmanaged, only leads to type II error, systematic
bias to survey response will distort the measures of any construct of interest. Any
such definable and identifiable phenomena that distort survey measurement are a
concern for survey researchers. It is no surprise that survey response styles
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received attention as early as 1937 when Lorge identified a “halo” that pollutes
attitudinal responses in a consistent direction independent of question coding
(1937). In 1938 Lentz specifically used the term acquiescence in describing a
“factor in the measurement of personality” (1938). Cronbach coined the term
response sets as the “tendency causing a person consistently to make different
responses to test items than he would have made had the same content been
presented in a different form” (1946). The idea of response sets in the broader
survey measurement field gained leverage in the 1950’s (Berg and Collier 1953,
Lewis and Taylor 1955, Fricke 1956, Kuethe 1960).
Since then extreme response and acquiescence has often been considered
together under the same heading of response set, response effect, response style or
response bias (Shulman 1973, Ayidiya and McClendon 1990, Hui and Triandis 1985,
Gilman et al 2008, Baumgartner and Steenkamp 2001, Cheung and Rensvold 2000).
There have been attempts to nuance the distinctions between the terms. For
example, Watkins and Cheung (1995) referred to systematic distortion in one
direction independent of item content as a response style; response set was defined
as conscious or unconscious desire to project a particular self‐picture by the
respondent (see also Lanyon 1982). Such nuances did not take hold in the literature
and are rarely acknowledged as both phenomena manifest in the same indicator of a
certain style of response. Their separation is impossible with most tools used by
researchers studying the phenomena.

6
Predictors of Survey Response Styles

As early as 1960 researchers had started to explore the predictors of
response sets. The most commonly used predictor is education (or social class
operationalized by a measure of education) and is consistently found to be a
negative predictor of acquiescence and extreme response (Lenski and Leggett 1960,
Landsberger and Saavedra 1967, De Jong et al 2008, Stening and Everett 1984,
Narayan and Krosnick 1996, Marin et al 1992, Carr and Kraus 1978). Along the
same lines Jackson and Pacine (1961) connected response sets to academic
achievement, Light and Zax (1965) to intelligence and Belli et al (1999) connected a
related construct, satisficing response, to cognitive ability (Krosnick 1991).
Other studies of response styles include cross‐cultural exploration (Javeline
1999, Watkins and Cheung 1995, Gilman et al 2008, Clarke 2000, Clarke 2001, Chun
et al 1974, Hui and Triandis 1989, Marin et al 1992, Cheung and Rensvold 2000, van
Herk et al 2004, Johnson et al 2005, Lamm and Keller 2007, Arce‐Ferrer et al 2006,
Smith 2004, Roster et al 2006, Stening and Everett 1984, Baumgartner and
Steenkamp 2001, De Jong et al 2008, Chen et al 1995, Ross and Mirowsky 1996) and
mode effects (Holbrook et al 2003, Jordan et al 1980, Kiesler and Sproull 1986,
Biemer 2001). Because the data used in this thesis is collected in the United States
through a self‐administered questionnaire, the results presented hold mode and
cultural factors constant. Future research could address other modes and contexts.

7
Satisficing and Survey Response Styles

Krosnick’s seminal article in Applied Cognitive Psychology introduced and
discussed hypothetical sources of satisficing in surveys (Krosnick 1991).
Acquiescence (or “agreeing with assertions”) is explicitly listed as a form of
satisficing but extreme response is not (Krosnick 1991:218). It could be argued that
extreme response could fit under the category “non‐differentiation in using rating
scales” as extreme response style means that the respondent is not fully utilizing the
entire width of the scale and therefore not differentiating between stronger and less
strong response categories (Krosnick 1991:218). But Krosnick thought of this more
as differentiating across items and not within (Krosnick 1991). In other words non‐
differentiation applies to the respondent giving the same response to a large
number of questions, and not providing different end point responses as would
happen with respondents with extreme response styles.
Krosnick (1991) identified three sources of satisficing behavior: (1) inherent
difficulty of the task, (2) respondent’s ability to perform the required task and (3)
respondent’s motivation to perform the task. Task difficulty is entirely dependent
on the questions. So if acquiescence or extreme response (or any other satisficing
tendency) is measured using a fixed set of items this source of the behavior cannot
be considered as a cause for variation across respondents.
Respondent’s ability, as already discussed in the previous section, has also
been referred to as cognitive ability. When direct measures of cognitive ability were
not available education was often used as a predictor of response styles. While
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Krosnick quickly dismisses that IQ, a highly heritable construct (Devlin et al 1997,
Visscher et al 2006), is not the same as cognitive ability, studies that directly looked
at cognitive ability also found the trait to be highly heritable (Plomin et al 1994,
Rietveld et al 2003). This suggests a possible mechanism through which satisificng
survey response could be genetically heritable. Also, familiarity with the topic and
the availability of preconditioned attitudes on the topic are cited as influencing
respondent ability and motivation (discussed more in detail in the next paragraph).
Given the broad range of topics in the survey used in this thesis, it is reasonable to
assume that, on average, no certain topic will influence any individual respondent’s
average survey response style scores.
Finally respondent motivation is broken down into the respondent’s need to
engage in high levels of cognition (Krosnick 1991). Ability to perform high‐level
cognition is not the same as having the will to perform high‐level cognition.
Performance of high‐level cognition will be dependent on the individual’s intrinsic
payoff for performing the mental exercises. Such payoffs could be related to
personality, which is known to be highly heritable (Eysenck and Prell 1951, Jang et
al 1998, Loehlin and Nichols 1976, Rose et al 1988, Rushton et al 1986, Bouchard et
al 1990, Pederson et al 1988, Horn et al 1976, Tellegen et al 1988, Heath et al 1992,
McCrae and Costa 2003, Riemann et al 1997). Secondly, motivation is also related to
how important and/or useful the respondent sees the survey to be. While this could
be influenced by the interviewer and other communications from the side of
researchers, but given a fixed contact procedure this influence should be relatively
constant in a specific survey effort such as the one used in this study. On the other
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hand, individual’s level of altruism could influence their views on the importance of
the survey. Agent based simulation models have identified mechanisms through
which altruistic behavior could evolve (Hammond and Axelrod 2006, Nemeth and
Takacs 2007). Assuming that these simplistic evolutionary simulations translate
into the real world, survey satisficing survey behavior could be genetically heritable
through the heritability of altruistic tendencies. And this appears to be the case as
questionnaire based empirical research using a twin design yielded 56% heritability
of altruism (Rushton et al 1986). Finally, respondent motivation has been linked to
accountability. If a respondent feels that they are accountable for their answers,
that they might have to justify them in the future, that could lead to less survey
satisficing behavior. While the survey protocol could certainly influence the feeling
of accountability in a respondent, it could also be influenced by the respondent’s
personality traits such as conscientiousness and possibly even neuroticism if the
respondent worries about being accountable. Tupes and Christal (1958, 1961)
identified five components that explain the majority of variation in someone’s
personality. These five components were later relabeled as the big 5.
Conscientiousness and neuroticism are two of the (big) five personality constructs
along with agreeableness, extraversion and openness. All of the big 5 personality
traits are known to be about 50% heritable (Jang et al 1998), through these traits
survey satisificing behavior could also be influenced by a respondent’s genetic
dispositions. And, finally, the length of the interview influences motivation but in
the survey analyzed here, the length was more or less constant given the small
number of skip patterns.
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In addition to his research on satisficing survey response Krosnick also
directly addressed possible sources of survey acquiescence in a later study
(Krosnick 1999). Krosnick divided explanations of satisficing into sociological and
psychological factors. The sociological explanation states that if the “researchers
and interviewers are perceived as being of higher social status the respondent may
defer to them out of courtesy”. From this perspective the respondent’s status and
self‐efficacy could both negatively influence acquiescing behavior. The
psychological explanation states that a person’s agreeableness will determine how
much they acquiesce on a survey. Agreeableness is a Big 5 personality trait known
to be highly heritable (Jang et al 1998) and Krosnick specifically states that because
of its links to agreeableness, acquiescence “may have genetic roots” (Krosnick
1999:553).

Expectations

The early literature treated survey response as a personality trait (Lentz
1938) but this presumption has not been followed up as the personality literature
has been refined. But today we know that personality is highly heritable and for this
reason it is reasonable to presume that survey response styles are also heritable.
The satisficing literature only specifically encompasses acquiescence though
extreme response could also implicitly fit satisficing survey behavior. Krosnick has
identified three mechanism though which, I posit, survey satisficing behavior could
have genetic roots. It is cognitive ability, altruism and accountability, with the latter
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being closely related to highly heritable Big 5 personality traits: conscientiousness
and neuroticism (Krosnick 1991). Additionally Krosnick’s psychological
explanation of acquiescence ties it to the third highly heritable Big 5 personality
trait: agreeableness (1999).
It is for these reasons I expect that both survey acquiescence and extreme
response style is genetically heritable. The theoretical evidence for suspecting
heritability of survey acquiescence is stronger then it is for extreme response style.

Classical Twin Design to Estimate Heritability

The classical twin design uses phenotypic data from twins reared together to
estimate the relative impact of heritability, common and unique environmental
factors. We know that identical twins share 100% of their genome. We also know
that, on average, fraternal twins share 50% of their genome. Given the availability
of data on twin pairs, it is possible to estimate how much of any trait is influenced by
the twins' genome (most often abbreviated as A), the environment they share (also
referred to as common environment and abbreviated as C), or the environment they
do not share (or unique environment abbreviated as E). The model to estimate
these is often called the ACE model. For example, if monozygotic (or MZ) twin pairs
correlate on the trait more than dizygotic (or DZ) twin pairs, we can infer that genes
influence the trait, whereas if identical twins and fraternal twins correlate equally,
there is a good chance their shared environment influences the phenotype.
Additional deviations from perfect correlations are attributed to the unique
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environmental influences. This unique environmental component also includes
measurement error as it is another cause of downward deviation from perfect co‐
twin correlation. In other words the model, to produce unbiased results, assumes
no measurement error. The proportion of error cannot be separated from true
environmental influences therefore special emphasis should always be placed on
careful phenotypic measurement with minimal measurement error when using a
twin design.
Until the 1970's, the classical twin design used no more than correlations to
estimate the percent of genetic and environmental influences (Falconer 1960, Alford
et. al. 2005, Medland and Hatemi 2009). Today, these estimations are done with
structural equation modeling, which allows for hypothesis testing, the assessment if
these estimates are significantly different from 0 (Neale and Cardon 1992, Medland
and Hatemi 2009).

Assumptions of the Classical Twin Design

The classical twin design makes a number of assumptions. It assumes that
parental mate choice is random on the phenotype. Violations of this assumption
bias heritability estimates downwards. The classic design assumes no gene by gene
or gene by environment interactions or correlations. Most of these assumptions are
not entirely realistic, though are not more restrictive than assumptions made by any
quantitative analysis using methods as simple as multiple regression. For example,
anyone who tests a regression without interaction terms also assumes no omitted
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interactions. Random mating can be assumed with regards to most phenotypes
studied, and can also be corrected with an extended design that includes data on
parents (Truett et al 1994, Maes et al 1997, Eaves et al 1999, Keller et al 2009,
Hatemi et al 2007a). Disregarding this assumption leads to deflated estimates of
heritability. Violation of the assumption is not overly problematic, as it only
increases the Type II error with regards to genetic heritability, the independent
variable that is relatively new and still controversial for the social sciences.
Gene‐gene and gene‐environment interactions can also be corrected with
extensions of the twin design. For example, if a twin modeler establishes there are
no common environmental effects on the phenotype, they switch to a model that
omits the estimation of the common environment and estimate possible dominance
effects (or within‐gene interactions, most often abbreviated as D) (Medland and
Hatemi 2009). Unfortunately, without phenotypic data from a more extended family
structure, only one of these two factors can be included in the model.
Additionally, behavior geneticists often correct for gene‐environment interactions.
The most commonly used gene‐environment models are gene by age interactions
(also known as age moderation) models (Feigon et al 2001, Koenig et al 2005, Maes
et al 2006, Klump et al 2007). There is a good reason for the widespread use of age
as the environmental variable in the interaction. A behavior geneticist would point
out that anything social scientists would consider “environmental” could (and
probably does) have a heritable component. A gene‐environment interaction might
not be just a gene‐environment interaction but a complex mixture of both gene‐gene
and gene‐environment interactions (Purcell 2002). The only purely environmental
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variable without any conceivable mechanism for a heritable component is age. At
odds with this, the behavior genetics literature does have rare examples of gene‐
environment interaction models where the interacted component of the
environment is of substantive social scientific interest. Using twin data, Harden et
al (2007) modeled the interaction between the heritability of adolescent cognitive
aptitude and socioeconomic status.
The issues mentioned in the previous paragraph are not the only reasons
gene‐environment models are problematic. Apparent but clearly estimatable gene‐
environment interactions can often be eliminated by mathematical non‐linear
rescaling of the phenotype's metric. Works as early as 1970 suggest that gene‐
environment interactions are, most often, measurement artifacts that should be
eliminated by metric manipulation (Jinks and Fulker 1970). Item response theory
(IRT) models used in this paper to produce a measure of extreme response style are
known to eliminate the scaling problem through the operational transformation
inherent to the model.
Twin and extended behavioral genetic models do not have to assume no
gene‐environment interaction as suggested by Charney (2008a). As demonstrated
in the cited articles, it is possible to model it. But to do so, a clear theory is required
on the mechanism highlighting which element of the environment is interacting
with the genes. These environmental variables need to be measured and the
interaction between the heritability component and the environment needs to be
modeled explicitly. As in the case of all models where independent variables predict
a dependent variable, when specific theoretical expectations do not exist for the
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interaction between the independent variables (in our case the specific aspects of
the environment that interacts with the heritable component of the phenotype) it is
common to start by assessing the existence of main effects of the independent
variables. This is the current study’s goal and for this reason it will not venture into
the area of gene‐environment interactions.
It is not uncommon for a political scientist to theoretically consider which
independent variables have an impact on the dependent variables. Nobody would
criticize a behavioralist claiming that there could be something else influencing the
dependent variable as well without offering specifics. A common critique of twin
design, on the other hand, argues that the unrealistic assumptions of the model
make all findings invalid, but does not specifically highlight specific things that
should be corrected for (Charney2008a).
The classical twin design makes the assumption that, on average, the
environment MZ co‐twins share is equally similar to the environment DZ twins
share. This is the equal environment assumption (or EEA). When researchers
whose disciplines are founded on the study of environmental influences on behavior
(sociology, political science, etc.), criticize the classical twin design, the first target is
the equal environment assumption (Horwitz et al 2003a, Richardson and Norgate
2005, Charney 2008a, Beckwith and Morris 2008). The impact of this assumption
on the estimates produced by the classical twin design is a legitimate concern. If the
equal environment assumption is violated, the classical twin design will
overestimate heritability and under‐estimate the impact of the common
environment. The leverage on estimating heritability stems from having
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information about how much of their genome, on average, the twins share and
having information on how much environment, on average, they share. But if we
lose the leverage on the environmental similarity in a way that monozygotic twins,
on average, share more of their environment than dizygotic twins, we completely
lose our ability to accurately estimate heritability.
The EEA was one of Charney's main concerns when criticizing Alford, Funk
and Hibbing (Charney2008a). The behavior genetics community, however, has
accumulated a large body of relevant literature in the past 30 years that went
uncited in the Perspectives in Politics exchange. A review of this literature is in
order.
Often cited examples of EEA violations include identical twins sharing their
bedrooms more often, therefore spending more time with each other than an
average fraternal twin pair. Monozygotic twins are also more likely to be dressed
alike than dizygotic twins. The use of these arguments was so common in the
debate about the methodological appropriateness of the classical twin design that
twin researchers started collecting this information (Loehlin and Nichols 1976,
Mitchell et al 2007a). But these questions do not constitute the only attempts to
measure and compare environmental similarity across MZ and DZ twins. Rose and
colleagues measured social contact of co‐twins (Rose et al 1988, Rose et al 1990).
Kendler and Gardner (1998) used a 12 question battery to measure environmental
similarity of twins.
Whether, for example, being dressed alike or not correlates in any way with a
given phenotype under study is an important question to consider. In the field of
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survey research, the question could arise if the characteristic of being dressed alike
between ages 0‐12 impacts in any way on survey response styles. It would be very
difficult to show any mechanism for direct relationship between the two; however, a
possible effect of being dressed alike during childhood could cause perception of
stronger similarity between the co‐twins. While stronger feelings of similarity and
closeness between the co‐twins could in turn influence many phenotypes under
study (such as psychological well being, substance use, etc), a long list of studies
failed to find an EEA violation (Hettema et al 1995, Kendler and Gardner 1998,
Kendler et al 2000, Xian et al 2000, Derks et al 2006). In light of these findings it is
very unlikely that EEA violations would significantly influence survey response
styles.
In reality, it is extremely difficult to imagine why parents of twins would
socialize one twin differently from the other regardless of how much the twins look
alike. A longer laundry list of responses to the EEA critique is available in the
Charney debate (Alford et al 2008a, Hannagan and Hatemi 2008, Alford et al 2008b).
But more complex mechanisms should be explored as to how identical twins
are treated differently by their parents or wider environment than fraternal twins.
Before we consider how zygosity of twins can lead to a different environmental
impact on them, we need to explore the accurate identification of the zygosity.
While self‐identification of zygosity is not problematic (Heath et al 2003, Neale
2003) Scarr and Carter‐Saltzman (1979) found that 40% of twins are misclassified
by others. A later study put this figure at 19.1% (Kendler et al 1993). Kendler used
this information on misclassification to see if it is perceived or actual zygosity that
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matters. The Kendler model corrected for both actual and perceived zygosity
simultaneously (Kendler et al 1993). To date, no evidence has been found to
indicate correction for perceived zygosity improves model fit with any phenotype,
suggesting the EEA leads to no bias in most cases.
The question of the amount of time twins spend together is more important.
Horwitz et al (2003a) pointed out that twins who spend more time together are
exposed to similar environmental influences such as peers, friends, their co‐twins,
etc. But they did not go past identifying this potential problem and considered this
as sufficient evidence to dismiss the field of behavioral genetics based on classical
twin design. What they should have done was correct for this possible violation
within the framework of the behavior genetic models.
What aggravates the problem is that the equal environment assumption is
often greatly misunderstood. First of all, the stochastic nature of the assumption is
often disregarded. The assumption does not claim that any given identical twin
pairs' environment will be the same as any given fraternal twin pairs' environment.
Rather, the environmental similarities between the co‐twins, on average, should be
the same for both mono‐ and dizygotic twin pairs. What is also often forgotten is
that any dissimilarity should specifically influence the phenotype studied. The
impact of environmental dissimilarity on phenotype should be evaluated directly
and theoretically.
While the equal environment assumption of the classical twin design has
received a lot of attention in the social sciences, based on the evidence presented in
this section it is fair to say that the critique does not invalidate twin research at
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levels that would make its use pointless. Therefore I proceed with assessing the
heritability of survey response styles and call for future theoretical research on the
specific possible mechanism that could lead to an assumption violation and
empirical research controlling for such identified mechanism. Lacking such specific,
theoretically grounded mechanisms this paper will not control for possible effects of
equal environment assumption violations. All models tested here will control for
age and sex. A separate chapter is devoted to additional control variables identified
to have an impact on survey response styles: education and income.
An assumption not discussed in the behavior genetic debates published in
the social sciences is the assumption of no measurement error. This assumption
stands in most quantitative analysis. For example, it is one of the assumptions of
regression models. But while in a regression measurement error only produces
type II error, in a behavior genetic model measurement error biases the unique
environment estimate upwards producing type I error for this estimate. Heritability
and common environmental effects are biased downwards producing type II error.
(McCrae and Costa 2003, Riemann et al. 1997). Measurement error will lead to
downward bias of co‐twin correlations and therefore an inflation of the
uncorrelated component of the result, the unique environment. Since all
components are expressed in percent of the variance explained an inflation of one
component naturally leads to a proportional deflation of the other components. For
this reason if measurement of the phenotype is inaccurate that will upward bias the
unique environmental component and downward bias the additive genetic and
common environment’s proportion. A downward bias of a component (towards
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0%) also increases the chance that the result will be incorrectly found statistically
nonsignificant increasing the chance of Type II error. An upward bias in turn leads
to an increased chance of type I error (McCrae and Costa 2003, Riemann et al.
1997).
The best approach to overcoming this problem is extremely careful
measurement and the utilization of available techniques to decrease measurement
error. As will become apparent from subsequent sections, this study devotes special
attention to measurement. Most studies simply take all available items on the
surveys for each individual and sum across them but this study will bring in
additional considerations of careful measurement that is fairly uncommon for
studies assessing survey response styles. In addition to careful measurement, latent
variable approaches are used where possible to decrease measurement error
further.

The Data

The National Survey of Midlife Development in the United States (MIDUS) is a
two‐wave general population sample that includes an oversample of twin pairs.2 Its
first wave was collected between 1995‐1996. Random digit dialing was used to field
a preliminary CATI survey and a follow up self‐administered mail survey was sent to
all participants. The MIDUS research team utilized aggressive multiple contact and
refusal conversion to ensure the representativeness of the sample. A nice pen and
In addition to twins, the data also included an oversample of siblings and urban
inhabitants. These oversamples were excluded from all analysis in this paper.

2
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$20 of cash was mailed to the phone survey participants. Multiple modes of
reminders were presented to the people who received the mail questionnaires. A
random sample of nonrespondents were offered $100 to become part of the sample.
The sample consisted of respondents between the ages of 25 and 74. For additional
information on the sample see Appendix A for an excerpt from the MIDUS website
and technical documentation.
The twin oversample of MIDUS was ascertained through approximately
50,000 random digit dialing screening calls where the respondent was asked if they
have a twin in the family. This procedure identified 998 twin pairs. The twin
oversample contained multiple families with more than one twin pair. After the
exclusion twins who were related to other twins in the dataset (to ensure the
independence of all co‐twins in the data) we were left with 359 monozygotic and
337 same sex dizygotic twins3. Different sex twin pairs and twins with uncertain or
conflicting zygosity self‐report were also excluded from the sample.
A second wave of the panel was fielded 10 years after the initial wave. The
second questionnaire contained a large number of questions identical to the first
wave. This study only considered questions that were not factual recall questions
and appeared in identical form on both questionnaires. The richness of the dataset
allowed us to develop the survey response style constructs on the sample of
singletons completely independent of the sample of twins used to assess heritability.

To maximize sample size one pair of twins were left in the data from families
where multiple twin pairs were included in the sample. The decision on which pair
to keep in was based on maximizing younger dizygotic same sex male twins in the
presented order of importance.

3
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The singleton sample was n=3091 after excluding individuals for whom the specific
responses used in this study were not available.

Measurement of Acquiescence

MIDUS included 36 seven point agree‐disagree questions (strongly agree,
somewhat agree, agree a little, don’t know, disagree a little, etc.) that were present
on both waves of the MIDUS self‐administered questionnaire in completely
unmodified form and could not have been skipped due to skip patterns.
Since some of the agree‐disagree questions on the questionnaire produced
highly uniform results in the entire sample where every individual responded on
one end of the scale producing a highly skewed variable. These items could be
considered poor, as their responses do not produce much variance. Also, when one
end of the scale (for example the agreement end) is just absolutely unsupportable
people who would normally acquiesce might not do so. This is true vice versa for
questions skewed in the direction of agreement. Highly skewed items introduce
measurement error. The inclusion of these items in the acquiescence construct is
problematic; they bias the mean independent of any respondent characteristic, only
depending on the direction of the skew. To minimize such bias, questions that
produced highly skewed responses in wave I of the singleton sample were removed.
If the absolute value of skewness was above 1 the question was excluded from the
analysis leaving us with 19 eligible items. (See Appendix B for the 19 specific
items.)
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Literature operationalizing acquiescence using secondary analysis of surveys
either used the sum of “clear” agreements minus the sum of “clear” disagreements
or took the difference between all agreeing and all disagreeing responses. Van Herk
et al (2004) used 1s and 2s minus 8s and 9s of a 9 point agree‐disagree scale, but for
a 5 point scale, much like Bachman and O’Malley (1984), used 1 and 2 minus 4 and
5. The most appropriate operationalization is debatable but lacking a clear theory
on the best measure of acquiescence it is difficult to reconcile this debate.
Past studies also assessed agreement and disagreement as distinct constructs
(Bachman and O’Malley 1984, Baumgartner and Steenkamp 2001). Bachman and
O’Malley (1984) found that agreement and disagreement counterintuitively
correlated positively, suggesting that acquiescence and extreme response are
constructs that independently better capture survey response styles. Directional
bias approach that averages the raw agree‐disagree scale responses is also
prevalent in the literature (Hui and Triandis 1985, Gilman et al 2008, Spector 1987).
This measure is popular amongst scholars in search of an acquiescence correction
(Hofstede 1980, Au and Cheung 2002, Ayçan et al 2000, Hofstede, 2001, Leung and
Bond 1989, Morris et al 1998, Schwartz 1994, Smith et al 2002) but such easy fixes
are not uncontroversial (Smith 2004). This measurement could also be heavily
biased by original question content if true scores of the items are, on average,
correlated.4

In an attempt to control for this problem I considered using uncorrelated items.
But unfortunately it is impossible to separate correlations arising from the item true
scores and the acquiescence bias. This consideration was abandoned.

4
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In this study I will assess the most comprehensive measure of acquiescence,
or net acquiescence response style as described by Baungartner and Steenkamp
(2001) also used by Bachman and O’Malley (1984) and van Herk et al (2004) that
incorporate both agreement and disagreement in a single construct by taking their
difference. To preempt additional debates on operationalization I compiled three
different measures of acquiescence. All 19 questions used in producing the
construct were agree‐disagree questions measured on a seven point scale. Measure
1 (acq1) sums the number of strongly agree responses across the 19 questions for
each individual and subtracts the sum of strongly disagree responses. Measure 2
(acq2) sums the strongly and somewhat agrees and subtracts the corresponding
disagrees. And finally, acq3 sums across all agreeing responses and subtracts all
disagreeing responses.
The operationalization as laid out here uses a simple sum across items. A
better approach would be to use a latent variable model where measurement error
is removed from the construct. (Such an approach is presented for extreme
response in the next section.) Unfortunately the net acquiescence response style
approach makes use of the sum of two positively correlated constructs (agreement
and disagreement) that prevents the utilization of a single latent variable. The one
approach in the literature that was able to overcome this problem using a
measurement error free latent variable model of acquiescence requires the
utilization of a balanced set of questions with half of the indicators using reversed
items (Billiet and McClendon 2000, Cheung and Rensvold 2000, van de Vijver and
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Leung, 1997)5. This approach was not possible with the available data. Due to the
unavailability of latent variable approaches traditionally used to minimize
measurement error I suspect that the reliability estimates will be lower then they
would be had we have a better, more measurement error free, way to construct an
acquiescence score. Due to this inability to more carefully measure acquiescence,
additive genetic and common environmental component estimates could be
artificially deflated and the unique environmental component estimate could be
artificially inflated. Again, this is due to the higher levels of random measurement
error deflating the co‐twin correlations and increasing the uncorrelated component
of the model.

Measurement of Extreme Response Style

One hundred and thirty‐four ordinal response category questions were
identified as present on both waves of the MIDUS self‐administered questionnaire in
completely unmodified form. This list excluded factual recall questions, questions
that could have been skipped due to skip patterns and personality items that are
used as frame of reference for the results. To be included the ordinal questions
needed to have at least four ordinal response categories and no additional category
offered beyond the ordinal response options.
While most studies used all available questions on the survey to produce a
measure of extreme response, Greenleaf (1992) convincingly argued that such an
Experimental studies also often utilized item reversal (Landsberger and Saavedra
1967, Javeline 1999)
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approach could be improved on to minimize measurement error. Greenleaf (1992)
argues that the best items to measure extreme response (1) have low item –
extreme response correlations (in other words they do not have large frequencies at
one of the extremes), (2) are uncorrelated with each other and (3) have roughly
equal extreme response proportions.
To identify the ideal questions for measuring extreme response style, first,
the 134 questions were correlated with their own dichotomous extreme response
score using Spearman’s correlation on the wave I singleton data. A response was
considered extreme if it was at either one of the ends of the ordinal scale. Questions
where the extreme response correlated with the raw response above an absolute
value of 0.3 were eliminated, leaving 21 questions. The questions eliminated were
predominantly questions with highly skewed responses.
The second step in the selection process was to ensure that the responses to
these questions did not correlate with each other. The 21 questions were entered
into an exploratory factor analysis with orthogonal (varimax) rotation. This
identified strongly correlated items (usually items from the same battery). For
correlated item‐pairs the ones with higher extreme response ‐ response correlations
were excluded removing seven items. Spearman’s correlation matrix of the
remaining 14 items was evaluated and two additional items were eliminated due to
correlations above 0.3.
For the remaining 12 items extreme response proportion ranged from 5.8%
to 31.1%. Greenleaf (1992) calls for roughly equal extreme response proportions
across the items. The four items with the lowest extreme response rate were
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eliminated leaving 8 items with the narrower range of 14.7% to 31.1%. Greenleaf’s
(1992) article ended up with lower correlations and a better extreme response
range for his dataset. Unfortunately comparable numbers could not have been
achieved with MIDUS. But to improve on Greenleaf’s approach a latent variable IRT
model is used to eliminate additional measurement error from the extreme
response style construct. In an IRT model multiple categorical indicators are used
to produce a latent factor underlying these indicators. This latent factor derives
common variation from the indicators discarding variation unique to the individual
items and therefore produces a more measurement error‐free construct than what a
simple summation of the indicators would produce (Ostini and Nering 2005).
En sum, Greenleaf’s (1992) rules were used on the wave I singleton sample
to identify the 8 best indicators of extreme response (also listed in Appendix C).
These questions had Inter‐Item and Item‐ERS Spearman’s correlations under 0.3,
and extreme response proportions between 14.7% and 31.1%. Results were
comparable in wave II of the singleton sample and in both waves of the twin sample.
As described above responses were recoded into dichotomous extreme response
items coding the extremes of the ordinal scales as 1 and all other responses as 0.
Contrary to acquiescence where a latent variable approach was not strait forward,
these extreme response items can be used as indicators of a latent variable
measuring extreme response style. An IRT model was used to construct a
continuous measure of extreme response style (de Jong et al 2008).
Given the larger pool of available items to select the best measures and the
appropriate latent variable approach for measuring extreme response style, I expect
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that the measure of extreme response will be more reliable then the measures of
acquiescence and the ACE variance decomposition estimates will be more accurate.

Methodology

Data cleaning, descriptive statistics, correlations and the exploratory factor
analysis for item selection were calculated using SPSS. All other models presented
were estimated with Mplus (Muthen and Muthen 2007) using maximum likelihood
unless otherwise stated. Since not all latent variables are created equal, the
uncertainty of the estimated latents was accounted for by the simultaneous
estimation of the measurement (IRT) model with every other presented result. For
this reason computationally intensive numerical integration was required. While it
is customary to present bootstrapped or likelihood ratio based confidence intervals
for the ACE components, this is computationally too taxing for latent variable
models such as the one presented here.6 In these situations it is common to present
standard errors based significance levels (Boomsma et al 2007, Muthen et al 2006).

Reliability of Extreme Response and Acquiescence

Due to the need to gain leverage on measurement error it is important to test
the reliabilities of both acquiescence and extreme response styles. Several studies
It is not uncommon for these models to run for 5 to 10 hours on a Core 2 Quad, 4
CPU PC running with 8GB of RAM. Hundreds of bootstrapped replications of these
models are simply not feasible computationally at this time.

6
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pointed to the test‐retest stability of both survey response styles in panel design
(Berg and Collier 1953, Bachman and O'Malley 1984). They attributed the different
survey response styles to different personalities. Hui and Triandis (1985) took
issue with this showing that stability decreases (though still high) as time passes
between measurements. Based on this and the careful measurement of both
constructs we can expect that acquiescence and survey response styles will have
reasonable internal and test‐retest reliability even with 10 years between
measurements. Since a latent variable approach that decreases measurement error
is only used for extreme response it is expected to have better reliability.
Using the first wave of MIDUS, internal reliability of the extreme response
measure was assessed through the IRT construction of two latents, one using the
first four and the other using the second four extreme response indicator items (see
Figure 1). The IRT model and the correlation of latents were estimated
simultaneously. Correlation of the latents was r=0.608 (SE=0.029). To compare, the
well established and understood big 5 personality construct of openness, the only
personality that was measured with at least 6 items on MIDUS (the minimum for
identification of the internal reliability IRT model), has an internal reliability of
r=0.574 (SE=0.010)7.
Using the second wave of MIDUS, test‐retest reliability was also assessed (see
Figure 2). The test model assumed that the indicators contribute equally to the
latent extreme response variable in both waves, therefore we can restrict the
loadings to equal each other in the two waves. These assumptions were tested
Internal reliabilities of openness was estimated with weighted least squares (WLS)
due to convergence issues with the equivalent maximum likelihood (ML) models.
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empirically; the restricted model fit better then the unrestricted model.8 Extreme
response test‐retest reliability was r=0.833 (SE=0.029). For the big 5 personality
items this was: Agreeableness r=0.795 (SE=0.015), Conscientiousness r=0.958
(SE=0.02), Extraversion r=0.854, (SE=0.013) Neuroticism r=0.726 (SE=0.018),
Openness r=0.855 (SE=0.013).9 While this analysis produced higher test‐retest
reliability for some personality measures, personality batteries had the unfair
advantage of having multiple category response options. Even independent of this
handicap, extreme response internal and test‐retest reliability can be considered
comparable to the well‐established Big 5 personality items.
The reliability test of acquiescence was more strait forward as it does not use
a latent variable model. As with extreme response, internal reliability was tested
using wave I of MIDUS and test‐retest reliability was tested using both MIDUS
waves. As mentioned above three different measures of acquiescence are used,
dubbed acq1, acq2 and acq3. Again, acq1 subtracted the number of strongly
disagreeing responses from the strongly agreeing ones to calculate acquiescence;
acq2 used strongly and somewhat agreeing and disagreeing responses while acq3
used all agreeing and all disagreeing responses.
To test internal reliability half of the 19 items (odd numbered) were used to
calculate a score of acquiescence and these were correlated to the other half (even

Unrestricted model: AIC=35314.262, BIC=35513.447
Restricted model: AIC=35304.919, BIC=35407.530
9 All loadings for these models were significant at p<0.001.
8
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numbered) items.10 Internal reliability of acq1 was 0.573, acq2 was 0.55 and acq3
was 0.537 all significant at (p<0.001). As expected, these reliabilities are lower than
extreme response reliabilities and are comparable to the internal reliability of
openness. Test‐retest reliabilities were also in the 0.5 range (acq1=0.544,
acq2=0.527, acq3=0.512, all p<0.001).
Figure 1: Measurement models testing the internal reliability of extreme response
and openness (Big 5 personality construct with the largest number of indicators)

Item 19 was dropped to ensure that the two halves were using the same number
of items. Sensitivity analysis dropping one different item revealed very similar
results. Internal reliability correlations for acquiescence are Pearson correlations.
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Figure 2: Test Retest Reliability of Extreme Response Style11

ACE Decomposition of Variance

Before I introduce the specific model used in this study, it is important to give
an overview of the simple univariate ACE model. Figure 3 graphically shows the
classical twin structural equation model for a single phenotype and the baseline
model it is traditionally compared to. This comparison is done with a chi‐square
difference test and assesses the appropriateness of using the ACE model. Both
models are two‐group models. The more complicated ACE model introduces
different model restrictions for MZ and DZ twins. The three circles represent latent
factors of additive genetic influence (A), common environment (C) and unique
environment (E). These latent factors influence the score of the phenotype as
denoted by the path going from the latent circles to the observed phenotype. The

I realize item 1 does not appear to measure extreme response well since it does
not reach the loading of the minimum of .3 used in exploratory factor models, but
rather than engage in a post‐hoc data driven modification of the model, I decided to
keep the item. One possible reason this item does not measure well is that it was
very early in the long survey when respondents are still relatively attentive.

11
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squared standardized path estimates for these arrows give us the proportion of the
latent factors’ impact.
Figure 3: Univariate ACE model and its baseline model below it.

A, C and E are not measured directly but assumptions are made about their
relations to one another. We know that monozygotic twins share 100% of their
genome and therefore the latent factor of A for twin 1 and twin 2 are perfectly
correlated for monozygotic twins as denoted by the curved arrow and the number 1
above it. We know that dizygotic twins, on average, share 50% of their genome and
for this reason the latent factor of A for twin 1 and twin 2 are correlated 0.5 for
dizygotic twins. Because we assume EEA as discussed above in detail, the
correlation between C1 and C2 is fixed at 1 for both MZ and DZ twins. E1 and E2 are
uncorrelated.
In most behavior genetics studies, follow‐up models restrict the
nonsignificant paths from A, C and E to the phenotype to 0. But Medland and
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Hatemi (2009) warn against the use of such follow up models when the full model is
estimated on data with small, underpowered samples. When sample sizes are small,
results are often nonsignificant due to lack of power (type II error) and not because
the effect is not present in the population. Inappropriately restricting a path to 0 in
a model will bias the results and for this reason it is best to keep the effects of
heritability, common environment and unique environment in the model, even if
one of these is nonsignificant.
The phenotype in these models does not necessarily have to be the raw
measured scores of construct of interest. They can be corrected for independent
variables leaving only the post‐control residual variance to be decomposed into A, C
and E. Generally age and sex are controlled for in these models. This thesis will also
include a section discussing the impact of income and education as predictors.
Baseline models are also adjusted accordingly with the predictors.
Since panel data is available it is more advantageous to use a multivariate
model that uses both waves of the panel. This is important as the sample size at
hand is considered small and is quite underpowered to estimate heritability and
common environment (but not unique environment) by twin research standards.
(Post‐estimation power analyses are presented with the rest of the results.)
Behavior genetic studies often use sample sizes in the 10,000’s. Adding the
additional data from wave II can increase power and can enlighten us concerning
the source of test‐retest stability of extreme response styles.
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Figure 4: Cholesky Decomposition ACE model for Acquiescence and Extreme
Response (simultaneously incorporating the IRT and ACE component of the model)

The most commonly used multivariate ACE model is the Cholesky
decomposition ACE model. In its bivariate form (the form used in this study where
two phenotypes are assessed) the model estimates the additive genetic, common
and unique environmental effects of the first phenotype, decomposes the
covariation between the two phenotypes into covariation due to additive genetic,
common and unique environmental covariation and estimates the additive genetic,
common and unique environmental effects of the second phenotype’s leftover
variation not explained by the covariation with first phenotype. In the baseline
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model for the Cholesky decomposition the four variables (wave1 for twin1, wave2
for twin1, wave1 for twin2 and wave2 for twin2) are corrected for the predictors
and are all correlated with each other. Due to size limitations Figure 4 only shows
the heritability model and for just twin 1. Same restrictions on the covariation
between twin1 and 2 presented in the univariate model are in place for A, C and E.
Since the two phenotypes in this study are the same, just measured 10 years
apart, it is reasonable to add an additional restriction to the Cholesky decomposition
ACE model. It is reasonable to assume that the impact of heritability, common
environment and unique environment will be identical across the two waves. The
model fit statistics presented in Appendix D show that the restricted models that
include the ACE restrictions and the additional restrictions equating the impact of
heritability, common and the unique environment across the two waves do not
hamper model fit as compared to the unrestricted baseline models.

Results

Table 1 present the heritability of variance and test‐retest covariance for the
three measures of acquiescence and for extreme response style. The results from
the three measures of acquiescence corroborate well showing significant 25% to
34% heritability, small and nonsignificant (10%‐11%) common environmental
effect and a large and highly significant (55%‐64%) unique environmental effect.
Note that any measurement error present biases this latter result upwards. Had we
measured acquiescence without measurement error we could expect this effect to

37
be lower and the other two effects to increase proportionally (McCrae and Costa
2003, Riemann et al. 1997).

Table 1: ACE decomposition of phenotype variance and covariance. Standard Errors
Acq1
Acq2
Acq3
Variance
Heritability (A)
0.251
*
0.341
**
0.294
**
(0.117)
(0.108)
(0.113)
Common Environment (C)
0.109
0.113
0.102
(0.1)
(0.094)
(0.096)
Unique Environment (E)
0.64
***
0.546
***
0.605
***
(0.038)
(0.034)
(0.037)
Covariance Between Wave I and II
Heritability (A)
Common Environment (C)
Unique Environment (E)
Total Covariance

0.251
(0.117)
0.109
(0.1)
0.222
(0.039)
0.582
(0.023)

*

***
***

0.341
(0.108)
0.113
(0.094)
0.149
(0.033)
0.603
(0.022)

**

0.09
(0.03)
0.154
(0.03)

**

***
***

0.294
(0.113)
0.102
(0.096)
0.174
(0.037)
0.569
(0.024)

**

0.101
(0.029)
0.164
(0.03)

***

***
***

in Parentheses
ERS
0.195
(0.195)
0.324
(0.161)
0.481
(0.069)

0.195
(0.195)
0.314
(0.161)
0.291
(0.075)
0.8
(0.037)

*
***

+
***
***

Controls Variables
Female
Age

0.03
(0.03)
0.013
(0.02)

***

***

0.172
(0.037)
0.235
(0.033 )

***
***

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Notes: Results are all standardized. Extreme response loadings are sightly different once age and
sex are controlled for. Rough magnitude and significance of the loadings have not changed and
therefore are not reported. Discrepancies observed between the test-retest reliability correlation and
the total covariance presented here are due to the inclusion of control variables.

It is interesting that extreme response, a survey response trait that has been
assessed to result from the same processes with other survey response styles like
acquiescence, provide different results. The trait is not significantly heritable (20%)
even with the improved leverage on measurement error. Common environmental
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effects, on the other hand, are significant at 32%. It is possible that this
nonsignificant result for heritability is due to lack of power as twin designs tends to
be extremely underpowered in most instances. Assuming the point estimates for
extreme response are accurate for the population (A=0.2, C=0.32 and E=0.48) with
the given panel design, the available sample size and assuming no item missing data,
no attrition and perfectly normally distributed phenotype I only had 59.2% power
to detect a significant relationship12. In reality power is probably somewhat lower
due to the unrealistic nature of these assumptions.
Additionally, genetic and common environmental effects heavily drive the
covariation between the two traits. Using the example of the first measure of
acquiescence, the numbers presented in the table can be interpreted as: of the 0.582
correlation, 0.251 is driven by heritability (A), 0.109 is driven by the common
environment (C ‐ though this result is not significant) and 0.222 is driven by the
unique environment (E). Expressed in percentages 0.251/0.582=43% of the
covariation is driven by A, 19% is driven by C and 38% is driven by E. For acq2
these percents of covariation are A=57%, C=19% and E=25%; for acq3 A=52%,
C=18% and E=31%; and for extreme response style A=24%, C=39% and E=36%.
Note that with the exception of extreme response where there is a slight
(1%) deviation for common environmental covariation (which also drove down
Power to detect C was above 80%. Power analysis for the acquiescence measured
yielded more power to detect A significantly but still under 80% for all three
models. For acquiescence power to detect C was extremely low. Behavior
geneticists generally do not consider 10% variance explained by a single component
other then E as worth exploring because of the lack of power, the enormous sample
size required to achieve significant results. Power to detect E was always within
rounding distance of a 100%.
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significance to p<0.10 from p<0.05), the amount of variance and covariance driven
by the heritability and common environmental components is equal. Genes and
common environmental components responsible for variation in the survey
response trait are also equally responsible for the stability of these traits in test‐
retest situations.
As for the control variables, with the exception of the first measure of
acquiescence where results were nonsignificant, females are significantly more
likely to acquiesce and provide an extreme response. The same is true for older
respondents.

Additional Control Variables

As described above with regards to the debates of the trade, behavioral
geneticists are wary of controlling for additional variables social scientists would
naturally consider. This is because these “environmental” variables are often not
fully environmental and have a heritable component (Purcell 2002).
If we control for, extract variance from, the phenotype attributed to such
“environmental” controls we will only bias (and make meaningless) the heritability,
common and unique environmental estimates of the phenotype of interest. But in
the social sciences it is customary to control for known covariates as we are
interested in the sources of the unexplained variance after control variables are
included. Technically it is possible to extract variance attributed to controls and
decompose the leftover variance into additive genetic, common and unique
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environmental sources. This is what the present section will do. Education has
often been used as a predictor of survey response styles. It has been considered a
proxy for social status (Lenski and Leggett 1960, Landsberger and Saavedra 1967,
Carr and Kraus 1978). In addition to education, income could also serve as a proxy
for social status. Table 2 presents the ACE variance decomposition results with
income and education corrected for (along with age and sex already controlled for
in the model presented in table 1). Due to the high colinearity of these traits they
will be considered independently in the models.
As seen from Table 2 additional controls do not have much substantive or
statistical effect on the heritability, common and unique environmental impact on
acquiescence or extreme response. Income or education correction also does not
really change the impact of age or sex on the phenotype. As found in previous
studies income and education has negative impact on acquiescence and extreme
response, though income’s effect on extreme response is not significant.

Table 2: ACE decomposition of phenotype variance and covariance with additional controls. Standard
Acq1 ct ed
Acq1 ct inc
Acq2 ct ed
Acq2 ct inc
Variance
Heritability (A)
0.258
*
0.239
*
0.288
*
0.34
**
(0.119)
(0.119)
(0.114)
(0.11)
Common Environment (C)
0.085
0.104
0.101
0.096
(0.101)
(0.1)
(0.098)
(0.095)
Unique Environment (E)
0.657
***
0.657
***
0.612
***
0.564
***
(0.038)
(0.039)
(0.037)
(0.035)
Covariance Between Wave I and II
Heritability (A)
Common Environment (C)
Unique Environment (E)
Total Covariance

0.258
(0.119)
0.085
(0.101)
0.226
(0.039)
0.568
(0.023)

*

***
***

0.239
(0.119)
0.104
(0.1)
0.228
(0.04)
0.571
(0.023)

*

***
***

0.288
(0.114)
0.101
(0.098)
0.175
(0.037)
0.564
(0.024)

*

0.059
(0.029)
0.121
(0.028)
-0.26
(0.026)

*

***
***

0.34
(0.11)
0.096
(0.095)
0.147
(0.034)
0.583
(0.023)

**

***
***

errors in parentheses.
Acq3 ct ed
Acq3 ct inc

ERS ct ed

ERS ct inc

0.211
(0.118)
0.114
(0.099)
0.675
(0.039)

+

0.187
(0.199)
0.308
(0.164)
0.505
(0.07)

0.2
(0.196)
0.309
(0.161)
0.491
(0.07)

0.211
(0.118)
0.114
(0.099)
0.202
(0.04)
0.528
(0.025)

+

0.072
(0.028)
0.124
(0.027)
-0.265
(0.025)

**

***

***
***

0.28
(0.115)
0.088
(0.097)
0.632
(0.038)

*

0.28
(0.115)
0.088
(0.097)
0.178
(0.039)
0.546
(0.025)

**

***

***
***

0.187
(0.199)
0.306
(0.164)
0.289
(0.077)
0.782
(0.043)

+
***

+
***
***

0.2
(0.196)
0.302
(0.161)
0.283
(0.077)
0.784
(0.043)

+
***

+
***
***

Controls Variables
Female
Age
Education

0.008
(0.029)
-0.01
(0.029)
-0.173
(0.026)

Income

-0.038
(0.032)
-0.001
(0.029)
***
-0.148
(0.026)

***

***

0.004
(0.032)
0.136
(0.029)

***

***
-0.192
(0.026)

***

***

0.013
(0.031)
0.14
(0.028)

***

***
-0.202
(0.026)

***

0.156
(0.035)
0.217
(0.037)
-0.142
(0.034)

***
***

0.158
(0.04)
0.239
(0.035)

***
-0.039
(0.034)

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: Results are all standardized.

***
***
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Discussion

The first striking aspect of the results presented is the difference between
acquiescence and extreme response style. While no significant additive genetic
effect has been found in extreme response, acquiescence appears to be heritable.
This does not mean that extreme response have no heritable component, it just
means we could not find a statistically significant additive genetic component with
this admittedly underpowered sample. Especially given the suspected amount of
measurement error in the two traits, results are suggestive as to the magnitude of
heritability in extreme response and acquiescence. For common environment the
story is vice versa where extreme response appears to have a significant common
environmental influence while the C estimate for acquiescence is too low to even
consider by behavior genetics standards.
The survey response literature considered these traits together as survey
response styles (or survey response sets). Implicit differentiation only emerged
from the acquiescence literature that did not list extreme response as a form of
satisficing behavior (Krosnick 1991). According to these findings the underlying
mechanisms driving these traits are probably different and call for a more nuanced
discussion of these traits.
The Cholesky design using the panel data allowed for the analysis of sources
of trait stability. It appears that additive genetic and common environmental
variation heavily contributes to trait stability. At first glance this is intuitive.
People’s genes do not change over time and common environmental, based on its
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most simple interpretation is rooted in socialization, something both co‐twin
received equally.
It appears that the satisficing literature is more in line with the findings.
First of all, it considers acquiescence as a source of satisficing but extreme response
is not. This could explain the apparent differences in the identified sources of
differential variation. It can be stated with confidence that any socialization factors
are negligible in interpersonal differences of acquiescence.
Looking at the heritability components of acquiescence there are multiple
mechanisms though which the relationship between a person’s DNA and
acquiescence could emerge. Krosnick identified four such mechanisms (Krosnick
1991, Korsnick 1999). Primarily, taking acquiescence at its face value, the most
simple mechanism is that it could be driven by the big 5 personality trait, (1)
agreeableness. In addition people who acquiesce are probably (2) more extraverted
and (3) more open. All three of these five big 5 personality traits are genetically
heritable (Jang et al 1998). Secondly, and still staying with big 5 personality
correlates, when considering that acquiescence could emerge from satisficing
behavior, people who understand that they are accountable for their survey
responses are less likely to satisfice and therefore less likely to acquiesce (Krosnick
1991). Conscientious individuals are more likely to be more accountable. Also,
neurotic individuals are more likely to fear being held accountable so they act
accordingly and minimize acquiescence. Third, less satisficing has been tied to
higher cognitive ability (Krosnick 1991), a highly heritable trait (Plomin et al 1994,
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Rietveld et al 2003). And finally less satisficing has also been tied to higher levels of
altruism (Krosnick 1991), once again a heritable trait (Rushton et al 1986).
Survey response styles (sets) have been treated in the past as personality
traits (Lentz 1938). It is plausible that the analysis of a more powerful sample could
yield significant heritable component for extreme response. If so, comprehensive
measures of personality dimensions, such as the Big 5, would be a good place to
start in finding specific genetic bases for extreme response, but the expectations for
these associations are also less clear.

Future Research

The classical twin design, though important, can only provide us with very
little information on what specific variables are driving individual differences. They
can point us in various directions. The prescriptions for acquiescence and extreme
response are different due to the apparently different results. For acquiescence one
place to look for specific predictors is in the genome. Among the studies of a large
number of phenotypes, association studies have successfully identified several
genes with an impact on social, and political behavior (Fowler and Dawes 2008,
Dawes and Fowler 2009). The same association techniques could be used to find
genes with an impact on acquiescence. While a genome wide approach would be
appropriate, these studies suffer from lack of power and an inductive, exploratory
approach that risks type I error. A better initial deductive test would be finding
genes already associated with the theoretically plausible heritable correlates:
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personality, cognitive ability and altruism. For example, the database,
www.genecards.org (accessed on November 1, 2009) produced 464 articles citing
137 specific genetic markers when searching for “personality”. Of these markers 45
were cited at least twice, 30 at least three, 21 at least four and 15 at least five times.
These better‐corroborated genetic markers of various measures of personality
could serve as testable hypotheses in an association study.
For extreme response the search should focus on environmental predictors
that co‐twins could share over their lifetime. An easy target for such research is
childhood familial and social variables and styles of socialization. To date no study
explored such variables as predictors of extreme response.
Needless to say, these results should be corroborated, preferably with larger,
more powerful datasets, before anything can be stated with reasonable certainty. A
more powerful sample could exhibit a significant heritable component of extreme
response, for example. But also, results might be different when different modes are
used or when different cultures are evaluated. The current design could be
extended to incorporate other family members for more precise estimation. Gene‐
environment interactions could be tested and there is room for both theoretical and
empirical work on possible equal environment assumption violations
inappropriately influencing the results presented here.
Other aspects of survey response could be explored as well. In addition to
acquiescence and extreme response, I considered estimating the impact of
nonresponse and respondent uncertainty.
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Initially, the data appeared to be an excellent candidate for the assessment
nonresponse. While no individual level meta‐data was available on initial sampling,
number of contacts, success of contact, it did have information on people who were
surveyed by the phone and lost later in the self‐administered questionnaire.
Unfortunately for the sample of twins, this number was extremely low. This makes
sense, as twins usually realize that they are important to science and tend to
respond at higher rates.13 Inconsistencies between the response rate of different
and same sex dizygotic twins lead me to believe that more aggressive refusal
conversion strategy was used for same sex twins, the twins most often used by twin
designs. Unfortunately, sources of this discrepancy were not documented by the
MIDUS project. In addition, the documentation contained no information on how
the twin oversampling was done making the use of response rate as a phenotype
practically impossible.
A second attempt was made to use nonresponse in wave II of the survey.
Unfortunately this nonresponse could occur for various reasons such as death,
researchers lost track, etc. While some documentation is available for reasons of
non‐contact, it is largely incomplete as it only documents failed recontact attempts.
But in some cases recontact was not even attempted since the respondent provided
no recontact information.

Actually, monozygotic twins are more likely to believe they are important to
science when in reality dizygotic twins are more important for twin samples. An
ideal sample to estimate heritability contains more dizygotic twins. Different
response rates stemming from this differential could be a source of EEA violation
treating nonresponse as the phenotype. This possibility deserves more attention.

13
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There is one possibility of gaining leverage on nonresponse. The first wave
of the survey included one page of extensive recontact details that was to be used
for the second wave of the study. The MIDUS dataset does contain information on
the status of this sheet for people who returned the self‐administered mail
questionnaire. This information can be used as a proxy for participation
willingness. While variance is low, as less then 10% of the twins failed to fill out or
return this recontact sheet, preliminary analysis using a logistic univariate ACE
model (much like the one presented in Figure 3) suggests that participation
willingness has absolutely no heritable component and is significantly driven by
common environment (47%, p<0.05) and unique environment (53%, p<0.001).
Although this information is not conclusive due to the small sample, indirect
measure of willingness to participate and the heavily selected sample already
excluding people who did not pick up the phone, refusing to participate in the phone
survey or blowing off the self‐administered follow up study completely. If these
results are corroborated on other samples, possibly with better measures, it
contributes to evidence for the lack of heritability of survey participation.
Building on current findings multivariate genetic assessments are in order to
test common genetic covariation between acquiescence and its predictors: (1) Big 5
personality measures, (2) cognitive ability and (3) altruism. If genetic covariation is
indentified direct association should be tested between the genes already linked to
these three predictors and acquiescence.
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Appendix A
[Note, this information is directly taken from MIDUS study documentations]
We cannot compute an exact response rate for MIDUS because we only wanted to
interview about half of people we contacted, and it is only the latter who should be
in the denominator of the response rate. We have no way of knowing how many of
the refusers would have been selected for interview, which means that we cannot
compute the denominator exactly. However, it is possible to make an estimate of the
number of people in the denominator and, based on this, an estimate of the
response rate. This estimate, the calculation of which is described below, is 70.0%
for the telephone interview, 86.8% for the completion of the main questionnaire
among the telephone respondents, and 60.8% for the overall response rate (0.700 x
0.868).
Comparison of the MIDUS I sample with the Current Population Survey (CPS, 1995)
revealed that the sample under‐represented those with a high school education or
less and African Americans. Alternatively, it over‐represented older males (by
intention, to facilitate gender comparisons by age). The representation by gender
and marital status was close to the CPS.
Of the original 7,190 individuals from whom data were collected at MIDUS 1
[including the general survey, the twin, the sibling and the urban oversamples], the
University of Wisconsin Survey Center (UWSC) was able to collect data from 4,975
cases 10 years later. However, 842 original participants refused to participate and
1,334 were not successfully recontacted. This last group included cases for whom
mortality was confirmed or suspected, those who were too ill to take the survey, and
all other cases that the UWSC was unable to contact.
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Appendix B: Questions measuring Acquiescence.
(Response categories: 1 strongly agree, 2 somewhat agree, 3 agree a little, 4 don’t
know, 5 disagree a little, 6 somewhat disagree, 7 strongly disagree)
<...>
A7 Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.
<...>
e. When I am sick, getting better is in the doctor's hands
f. It is difficult for me to get good medical care
<...>
F1 Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
<...>
s. There is little I can do to change the important things in my life
t. I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life
w. What happens in my life is often beyond my control
y. There are many things that interfere with what I want to do
<…>
<...>
K17. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
a. The world is too complex for me.
b. I don't feel I belong to anything I'd call a community
c. People who do a favor expect nothing in return
<...>
e. The world is becoming a better place for everyone
f. I feel close to other people in my community
g. My daily activities do not create anything worthwhile for my community
h. I cannot make sense of what's going on in the world
i. Society has stopped making progress
j. People do not care about other people's problems
k. My community is a source of comfort
l. I find it easy to predict what will happen next in society
m. Society isn't improving for people like me
<...>
<…>
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Appendix C: Questions measuring Extreme Response Style.
<…>
A15. During the past 30 days, how much of the time did you feel...
1,All of the time 2,Most of the time 3,Some of the time 4,A little of the time 5,None of the time

<…>
f. ...full of life?
<…>
<…>
F1. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
1 strongly agree, 2 somewhat agree, 3 agree a little, 4 don’t know, 5 disagree a little, 6 somewhat disagree, 7 strongly disagree

<…>
y. There are many things that interfere with what I want to do
<…>

<…>
F6. The next few questions are about the way you decide what you want out of life
and how you go about trying to achieve your goals. For each situation below, two
different strategies are listed. Please indicate whether your own strategy is more
like the one listed in column A or the one listed in column B. While the way you do
things may be different depending on the particular goal, and may include parts of
both strategies, please circle the answer that is true for you overall.
MORE LIKE A 1, A Lot ‐ 2, Some ‐ 3, A Little ‐ 4, A Little ‐ 5, Some ‐ 6, A Lot MORE LIKE B

STRATEGY A

STRATEGY B

F6a. When choosing my goals...
I prefer to choose one or two
important goals and really
focus on achieving them.

I prefer not to limit myself ‐‐
I keep my options open so I
can take advantage of
anything that comes up.

<…>
F6c. If I don't seem to have a particular skill or resource that I need to reach my
goal...
I look for other things I could
do to reach my goal ‐‐ to make
up for what I don't have or
can't do.
<…>

I keep trying my best, and if
that doesn't work, I think
again about whether that
goal is right for me.
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<…>
K17. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
1 strongly agree, 2 somewhat agree, 3 agree a little, 4 don’t know, 5 disagree a little,
6 somewhat disagree, 7 strongly disagree
<…>
c. People who do a favor expect nothing in return
<…>
j. People do not care about other people's problems
k. My community is a source of comfort
<…>
<…>
Q5. Using a 0 to 10 scale where 0 means "no thought or effort" and 10 means "very
much thought and effort," how much thought and effort do you put into the sexual
aspect of your life these days?
None 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 Very Much
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Appendix D: ACE Model Fit Compared to the Respective Baseline Models
-2LL

Chi-Square

df

p-value

16368.972
16376.758

7.786

6

0.25

Extreme Response Style w/ Education
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

16001.668
16008.9

7.232

6

0.30

Extreme Response Style w/ Income
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

22156.824
22164.146

7.322

6

0.29

Acquiescence 1
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

19213.212
19220.166

6.954

10

0.73

Acquiescence 1 w/ Education
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

24960.928
24966.234

5.306

10

0.87

Acquiescence 1 w/ Income
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

24778.632
24785.604

6.972

10

0.73

Acquiescence 2
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

20702.882
20710.726

7.844

10

0.64

Acquiescence 2 w/ Education
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

26394.462
26399.71

5.248

10

0.87

Acquiescence 2 w/ Income
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

26243.546
26251.856

8.31

10

0.60

Acquiescence 3
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

21682.208
21689.9

7.692

10

0.66

Acquiescence 3 w/ Education
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

27366.442
27372.732

6.29

10

0.79

Acquiescence 3 w/ Income
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

27217.57
27225.242

7.672

10

0.66

Extreme Response Style
Phenotypic Saturated Model
ACE Model

Note: Degrees of freedom for Extreme Response Style is less then for Acquiescence. The Extreme Response Style model has
fewer estimates because the IRT model used to produce the latent scores restricts their variance to 1. For this reason total
variance of the phenotype is not an estimate and Unique Environment is calculates as 1 – Heritability ‐ Common Environment.

